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INTRODUCTION 
Is Ulster sliding toward a situation of increased polarization and 
violence or is the middle ground being strengthened? Events of the 
past one and a half years, culminating in the 9 June 1983 general 
election for the Westminster Parliament, suggest that the former, 
more pessimistic assessment is the case. In the words of Barry White, 
that election "has been the most depressing election for years with 
die two voting communities (Nationalists and Unionists) not even 
trying to relate to one another."1 
Politically, the most important events of the past eighteen months 
include not only the 1983 Westminster Parliamentary elections but 
also the Northern Ireland (Ulster) Assembly elections, and the for-
mation of the New Ireland Forum in Dublin. These events illustrate 
the lack of trust and political cooperation between Nationalists and 
Unionists as well as fissures within these communities. Indeed, the 
bickering within the Unionist community over who is the "most or-
ange," and within the Nationalist community over who is the "most 
green," is reaching epidemic proportions. 
While the Westminster Parliament is the most important elected 
body in Great Britain, and the primary source of governmental au-
thority, the Assembly is a purely local body with no official powers. 
The Forum is an informal arrangement among politicians and no 
official elections have ever been held. The election campaigns and 
results of the Westminster and Assembly elections, and the organi-
zation of the Forum indicate the major trends in Ulster politics, and 
the obstacles to cross-community cooperation. The Assembly elections 
and Forum activities illustrate the lack of cross-community coopera-
tion which was epitomized in the Parliamentary elections. 
The insular nature of Ulster's politics tends to magnify the prob-
lems that do exist and adds to the self-perpetuating nature of the 
conflict. Although Ulster is part of Great Britain, elections are won 
or lost on purely local issues. In essence, each is a continuation of the 
Irish Civil War, which ended in Eire in 1923. The political parties 
were all born out of and relate to the sectarian strife of the Province, 
and they exist nowhere else in Great Britain. Although there is a 
formal affiliation between the Official Unionist Party (OUP) and the 
British Conservative Party, it does not appear to have much effect on 
the direction of Ulster politics. The main British parties, Conservative, 
Labour, Liberal, and Social Democratic (SDP), exist in England, Scot-
land and Wales but not in Ulster. Like Ulster, Scotland and Wales 
also have unique local parties yet, unlike Ulster, the main political 
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parties are strongly entrenched and are the primary vehicle of political 
expression. The bickering among communities in Ulster precludes 
their involvement in the mainstream of British politics. This insularity 
prevents voters from viewing issues in their larger context where it 
might be possible to reach for new solutions. The Assembly and Par-
liamentary elections along with the formation of the New Ireland 
Forum serve to point up the insular nature of Ulster politics and their 
fixation on the unresolved issues of the Irish Civil War. 
There are five important political parties in Ulster, the Official 
Unionist Party (OUP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Al-
liance Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and 
Sinn Fein. The DUP is the most extreme Unionist party and its rhet-
oric is often inflamatory. Its electoral support had been increasing 
relative to that of the OUP, but the 1983 election seems to have 
arrested this trend. The OUP, considered the establishment party, 
did have unquestioned dominance over Ulster from 1922 through 
1972. Like the DUP, they are strongly opposed to power-sharing and 
unambiguously in favor of the Union. The real differences between 
the OUP and DUP are minor. In many cases they reflect personality 
clashes between leaders rather than serious policy differences. 
The only truly moderate Unionist party, the Alliance Party is 
committed to a policy of power-sharing in Ulster. They support the 
link with Great Britain but believe it is imperative to bring all sections 
of the Ulster community into the governing process. They are be-
coming increasingly frustrated. As they watch the extremists in both 
the Nationalist and Unionist camps battle internally, their middle 
ground becomes increasingly difficult to sustain and their support is 
decreasing. 
The SDLP is the party of constitutional Nationalism. They wish 
to see a united Eire achieved through peaceful means. The SDLP 
differs from the extremist Nationalist groups in that it eschews viol-
ence. Its means are moderate but its goal is the withdrawal of Ulster 
from Great Britain and unification with Eire. 
Sinn Fein, with their barely concealed contempt for the ballot 
box, believe violence is a legitimate means to their end of a united 
Irish state. According to Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein leader, "The IRA's 
campaign of violence is a necessary and morally correct form of re-
sistance in Northern Ireland . . . . The IRA needed no electoral man-
date for its armed struggle, and Sinn Fein is unapologetic in its defense 
of the IRA's right to engage in armed resistance to the British presence 
in Northern Ireland."2 As the official political wing of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA), they are committed to a united Ireland 
at any cost. They envision some form of a "socialist republic" over 
the entire island as their final goal. The other four main political 
parties will have nothing to do with them, however, their support is 
increasing in the Nationalist community. 
In considering Ulster politics, one salient point should especially 
be borne in mind. The main Unionist parties—DUP and OUP—share 
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a similar philosophy. They differ over tactics but they are both com-
mitted to maintaining the Union and making sure that Ulster's in-
terests, as they see them, are not sacrificed by the British government. 
They are adamantly against power-sharing and believe that direct 
rule from London should be ended as soon as possible and local rule 
re-instituted. Of course, without some form of guaranteed power-
sharing arrangement with the minority, community local rule will lead 
back to the type of situation that preceded the fall of the original 
Stormont Parliament in 1972. This would be totally unacceptable to 
the minority (Nationalist) community as well as the British govern-
ment. Some Unionists have hinted that extra-legal methods such as 
Ian Paisley's "third force" might be necessary if they thought the 
British government were about to sell them out. "Neither the DUP 
or OUP acknowledge any Irish dimension . . . and there is no sign of 
a hand being held out to the minority or of an acknowledgement that 
one version of Nationalism is less desirable than another."3 In spite 
of the strong personality clashes between OUP and DUP leaders it is 
at least theoretically possible for them to cooperate. 
It is not theoretically possible for the SDLP and Sinn Fein to work 
together. They are philosophically irreconcilable and their tactics and 
goals are mutually exclusive. The SDLP recognize that their goal of 
a united Ireland can only be achieved with the consent of the Unionists 
of Ulster. They believe in the gradualist approach. Sinn Fein, on the 
other hand, is the party of the "armalite and the ballot box." This is 
a contradiction in terms, meaning, in essence, that Sinn Fein may use 
terror against its opponents while it claims democratic rights for its 
supporters. 
Given these facts it is not surprising to find that the tenets and 
activities of the Assembly (a Unionist dominated body) and the New 
Ireland Forum (a Nationalist dominated body), plus the results of the 
1983 Parliamentary elections, confirm the seemingly incompatible na-
ture of the main communities in Ulster. 
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 
Ulster had its own local parliament, Stormont, from the time it 
was formed as a separate political entity in 1922 through 1972. In 
1972 Stormont was abolished and all its powers transferred to the 
Westminster Parliament in London. It has been the desire of all sub-
sequent British governments to find a workable system for devolution 
of power back to Ulster. James Prior, appointed Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland Affairs in 1981, has been strongly committed 
to fostering a power-sharing arrangement among Unionists and Na-
tionalists that would provide a smooth path to devolution. To this 
end, he announced, at the time of his appointment, his intention to 
work quickly toward the formation of a local governing body with the 
organization of the Assembly in 1982 and scheduled elections for 21 
October 1982. Prior believed that local instruments of government 
must be created in the Province where both Unionists and Nationalists 
will have an opportunity to accommodate their differences. The major 
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premise behind the Assembly concept was that agreements to engage 
in voluntary power-sharing were essential before powers could be 
devolved from London. Although the dominant Unionist and Na-
tionalist parties were making statements which, if taken at face value, 
would have precluded a power-sharing arrangement, Prior believed 
that a first step had to be taken to break the log-jam. His philosophy 
was that once the Assembly was set up things would fall into line. 
However, this has not happened for several reasons. 
Prior hoped that the SDLP, the party of constitutional Nation-
alism, would win a large enough vote to be able to consider it a 
mandate to participate in a dialogue with the Unionists in the Assem-
bly. A closer examination of the situation of the SDLP in relation to 
Sinn Fein shows that it would have been virtually impossible for the 
SDLP to participate in the Assembly without harming their credibility 
in the Nationalist community. SDLP and Sinn Fein contested the 
Assembly elections to show their strength in the Nationalist com-
munity but, if the SDLP had agreed to participate in the Assembly, 
they would have been outflanked by Sinn Fein and their support 
undermined. The SDLP are forever worried that they will be accused 
of selling out by the extremist Nationalist groups. They have good 
reason to be concerned as the trend to increased support (see Table 
1) of Sinn Fein continued through the 1983 Westminster Parliamen-
tary elections. 
The SDLP, therefore, viewed the Assembly as unworkable from 
the start. According to John Hume (SDLP leader), "It is a process to 
which the limits of negotiation and the terms of negotiation have 
already been set by the British government."4 As the SDLP have as 
their ultimate goal a thirty-two county Irish Republic, the Assembly, 
as an organ of the British government, is basically antithetical to their 
interests. They are convinced that if powers were really devolved, the 
Nationalist community would find itself in the same situation as that 
which existed in the old Stormont Parliament, namely that the Union-
ists, being a majority, would disregard the rights of the Nationalist 
community. 
Prior made it perfectly clear on many occasions that there would 
be no devolved government without SDLP participation. "I am certain 
that there is no way in which the Assembly can make progress towards 
devolved government unless the participation of the SDLP is in-
sured."5 While Prior was talking up the Assembly, SDLP leaders were 
stating very unambiguously that they were only interested in "a real 
solution . . . insisting the Assembly would not work and that no so-
lution could be confined exclusively to Northern Ireland."6 The SDLP 
belief in the importance of considering the Irish dimension was soon 
to manifest itself in the formation of the New Ireland Forum. 
The Sinn Fein concentrated on stressing the uselessness of the 
Assembly. They attacked the SDLP for their moderate approach and 
blamed most of the Province's ills on the British presence. Their 
campaign was interesting from the standpoint of what it excluded. 
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TABLE 1 
ELECTORAL TRENDS 
PARTY 
OUP1 
DUP2 
ALLIANCE 
SDLP3 
SINN FEIN 
OTHERS 
TOTALS 
June 1983 
Total 
Votes 
259,952 
152,749 
61,275 
137,012 
102,701 
51,236 
764,925 
Per cent 
Share 
34.0% 
20.0% 
8.0% 
17.9% 
13.4% 
6.7% 
Assembly 
Election 
Oct. 1982 
188,277 
145,528 
58,851 
118,891 
64,191 
57,582 
633,129 
Per cent 
Share 
29.7% 
23.0% 
9.3% 
18.8% 
10.1% 
9.1% 
Local 
Council 
Election 
May 1981 
176,342 
176,816 
59,219 
116,487 
— 
136,596 
665,502 
1- OUP (Official Unionist Party), 2- DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), 
3- SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party). 
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They paid little heed to the Protestant sector of Ulster society, giving 
the impression that the Protestants (Unionists) do not exist. This was 
almost a mirror image of tactics used by extremists in the Unionist 
camp, pretending that the Catholics do not exist. Ultimately they 
believe that if the Catholics do not like the governmental structure in 
Ulster then they should move to Eire. Likewise, extreme Nationalists 
view the Protestants as an alien presence, believing if Protestants do 
not like the idea of thirty-two county Ireland, then they should return 
to Britain. Despite the one-sidedness of their campaign, or perhaps 
because of it, Sinn Fein support picked up substantially. This trend 
continued into the 1983 Parliamentary election. 
The Alliance Party, the moderate Unionist party, captured only 
ten of the seventy-eight Assembly seats. They are becoming partic-
ularly exasperated by the main Unionist parties which refuse to make 
concessions or to consider any compromise that would allow the SDLP 
to participate in the Assembly. The Alliance Party does not accept 
SDLP rhetoric literally. Rather, they believe that if the SDLP were 
guaranteed a power-sharing arrangement that would allow Nationalist 
participation in decision-making, and guarantee representation of Na-
tionalist interests, the SDLP would give up their insistence on a united 
Ireland and participate in normal political life in the Province. Fur-
ther, the Alliance Party refuses to consider that the SDLP actually 
feels that Ulster, as it is presently constituted, is not a "normal" political 
entity allowing "normal" forms of political participation. In any case, 
they believe Unionists must make the first move in order to induce 
the SDLP to change their position, realizing that if Unionists do not 
work seriously toward an accommodation with constitutional Nation-
alists they may find themselves faced only with extremists. Unhappily 
for the Alliance Party, most Unionists believe power-sharing to be a 
type of fifth column that will eventually lead to a loss of the Unionist 
rights and the SDLP must also take that fact under consideration. 
The main issue of the election campaign between the OUP and 
DUP was which party would be the majority Unionist party. The OUP 
was able to stop the flow of support from its ranks to the DUP. The 
OUP gained on the DUP over the previous 1981 local government 
elections and this trend continued into the 1983 general election (see 
Table 1).* Unionists won a majority in ten of the twelve multiple 
member constituencies. Only in South Belfast does the OUP have 
more votes than the combined total of other parties. In no other 
constituency does any one party have an absolute majority. Since the 
SDLP and Sinn Fein representatives pledged never to take their seats, 
there is a de facto Unionist majority in all twelve constituencies.** 
As a result, the Assembly is a "talking shop" for various shades 
of Unionist opinion, without any real powers. All power still emanates 
from London. Given the present political situation it is difficult to 
imagine that it will ever have any real power. Mr. Prior has been 
criticized for setting up the Assembly before he was sure of cross-
community support, though his feeling was that the Assembly would 
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ignite this support. An editorial in the Belfast Telegraph the morning 
after the election results were tabulated summed up the situation very 
well: "Out of the general shambles . . . it is clear that there is now no 
hope of the Assembly achieving its original objective of devolved gov-
ernment. Some may still cling to this mirage publicly, but the makeup 
of the Assembly is such that it would be impossible to prove cross-
community agreement."7 There cannot be power-sharing if there is 
nobody to share it with. London is not about to devolve power to an 
Assembly that has no minority community representation. The situ-
ation appears to be at an impasse. 
THE NEW IRELAND FORUM 
The first meeting of this body was held on 30 May 1983. No 
formal elections were held for the Forum as it was strictly an arrange-
ment among the main Nationalist parties of the island to hold regular 
consultations on the subject of unity. Meeting in Dublin, the goal of 
the New Ireland Forum is to reconcile the different peaceful ap-
proaches to achieving Irish unity. It is hoped that the Forum will draw 
up a blueprint, or a number of blueprints, for a united Ireland. The 
driving force behind the idea of the Forum was the SDLP although 
it is composed of up to ten representatives from that party and each 
of the three main Irish political parties (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, and 
Labour). 
Specifically, John Hume (SDLP leader) wants to concentrate on 
"economic aspects of Irish unity and church/state relations to create 
an all-inclusive definition of Irishness and suggested forms of insti-
tutional expression."8 By its very nature, then, the Forum is almost 
doomed to become a perpetual "talking shop." In order to attract the 
Unionists, the definition of "Irishness" will have to be greatly ex-
panded. This will entail amending the Irish constitution to remove 
much of the Catholic component of Irish nationalism. It seems un-
likely that the moderate to extreme republicans in the South will go 
along with this course of action and the 7 September 1983 abortion 
referendum and its accompanying campaign tends to support this 
viewpoint. In the words of Elaine Harvey, a delegate to the annual 
Irish Congresses of Trade Unions conference held in July 1983 
"Chances for Irish unity could be set back for years if the Republic 
passes a constitutional amendment on abortion,"9 and the amendment 
passed by an almost two to one majority. In addition to opposition 
from Republicans in the South, it is debatable whether a significant 
number of northern Republicans would support any accommodation 
with Unionist tradition. The SDLP is trying as best it can, given the 
constraints with which it is faced, to put forth the view that an ac-
commodation with Unionist tradition is a necessary prerequisite to 
the peaceful unification of Ireland. The recent Parliamentary election 
shows Sinn Fein to be pulling almost even with the SDLP in the 
Nationalist community, a move which bodes ill for the future of con-
stitutional Nationalism. 
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The Unionist parties have refused to participate in the Forum 
basically because they view it as an attempt to undermine the union 
between Ulster and the rest of Great Britain. The leaders of the DUP 
and OUP have denounced the Forum. Invitations to the three main 
Unionist parties in Northern Ireland to participate in the Forum was 
condemned by the spokesmen for these parties. A delegation of Al-
liance Party members met with the Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach) 
to explain what they did not like about the Forum and was condemned 
by the DUP and OUP just for attending this meeting. This provides 
a good indication of how strongly the Unionists feel about the Forum. 
As the Forum is committed to a peaceful resolution of the Irish 
conflict an invitation was not issued to Sinn Fein. The efforts made 
by the SDLP and other Forum participants to attract Unionists seem 
to be genuine although their approaches differ and seem doomed to 
failure. Fianna Fail was the most adamant about immediate British 
withdrawal as a precondition for progress. Fianna Fail's position is 
that Britain has to move first, whereas the Fine Gael and Labour 
position is that there must be a reconciliation between the communities 
in Northern Ireland. The SDLP position favours a little of both. "If 
you wish to persuade the British government to move, you must show 
that there is movement also for reconciliation."10 This statement by 
John Hume marks the underlying dilemma of die Irish conflict, namely 
that the Nationalist and Unionist communities live in two separate 
worlds. The Unionists are not interested in removing British troops 
from the island. They consider themselves to be British, not Irish. 
They want no part of a thirty-two county all-island state. In Unionist 
eyes, participation in the Forum would negate this fundamental belief. 
For their part, the SDLP wants no part of the Assembly because 
they believe participation would negate their fundamental goal of a 
united Ireland so Unionist never meets Nationalist. If the New Ireland 
Forum fails to make some type of progress, the cause of constitutional 
Nationalism will suffer a grave setback. As Sinn Fein support increases 
and as it becomes increasingly clear that Unionists will have no part 
of the Forum the position of the SDLP will become more precarious. 
Leaders of the main Irish political parties realize the gravity of the 
situation. The spreading violence in Ulster has a great destabilizing 
effect in Eire. Mr. Haughey (Fianna Fail leader) stated during the 
opening session of the New Ireland Forum that "We may have to 
consider some degree of autonomy for Northern Ireland be it on the 
basis of the same area, or a smaller one."" They are attempting to be 
reasonable. However, without some form of Unionist participation 
the Forum will remain stalled. 
9 JUNE 1983 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
"Ulster's Prospects are Untouched by the British Votes,"12 a head-
line appearing in the New York Times, was a fairly good condensation 
of the overall results of this election. The large Conservative majority 
gave the Ulster parties very little leverage. The Unionists obviously 
will not be in a "balance of power" situation. The Conservative gov-
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ernment of Margaret Thatcher could put Ulster on a back burner if 
it so desired. (The final composition of the House of Commons is 
detailed in Table 2.)*** 
The rivalry between the SDLP and Sinn Fein split the Nationalist 
vote to the advantage of the Unionists. Of the six constituencies where 
the SDLP or Sinn Fein had a chance of winning a seat (West Belfast, 
South Down, Mid Ulster, Foyle, Armagh-Newry, and Fermanagh-
South Tyrone), the Unionists formed election pacts in the latter three. 
The OUP stood down in Foyle while the DUP stood down in Fer-
managh-South Tyrone and Armagh-Newry. There was no chance of 
a Unionist winning in West Belfast because of the huge Catholic ma-
jority. Approximately 40,000 Catholics and 17,000-18,000 Protestants 
are registered to vote in West Belfast. Therefore, the Unionist rivalry 
put a Unionist majority in jeopardy in only two areas whereas the 
Nationalist rivalry jeopardized five of six seats (see Table 4). 
The eleven other Ulster parliamentary districts were guaranteed 
Unionist representatives because of large Protestant majorities (most 
Protestants are Unionists and most Catholics are Nationalists). The 
only question was which of the Unionist parties would win. As there 
was no immediate danger of a victory by a Nationalist candidate, the 
Unionist candidates spent their time attacking each other. In Antrim 
South, Belfast East, Belfast North, Belfast South, North Down, Lagan 
Valley, Londonderry East, North Antrim, Strangford, and Upper 
Bann the winners all won by fairly substantial margins, despite the 
fact that the Unionist parties expended much effort campaigning 
against each other. However, Antrim East was a very hard-fought 
contest with victory going to Roy Beggs, the OUP candidate, by only 
367 votes. Jim Allister (DUP) and Roy Beggs each accused the other 
of "betraying the Unionist cause." 
TABLE 2 
PARTY 
Conservative 
Labour 
Liberal 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
**Official Unionist Party (OUP) 
••Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
Plaid Cymru 
Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) 
**Popular Unionist Party (PUP) 
**Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
**Sinn Fein (SF) 
**Ulster Parties 
NO. OF SEATS 
397 
209 
17 
6 
11 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
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The race in North Down was cut and dried, and there was never 
any doubt that Mr. Kilfedder, Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) can-
didate, would win. His large personal following gave him a 13,000 
vote majority. He has represented North Down at Westminster since 
1970 and has been feuding with the leaders of the OUP since 1974. 
He officially left the OUP in 1979 because of personality conflicts with 
Enoch Powell. There are no substantial policy differences between 
the OUP and PUP. The PUP is built around Mr. Kilfedder's individ-
ualistic style, and without him the party would probably dissolve. 
The split between Nationalists allowed three of the six marginal 
seats to fall to Unionists. As Table 4 illustrates, there are Nationalist 
majorities in Mid-Ulster, Armagh-Newry and Fermanagh-South Ty-
rone. The battle in Fermanagh-South Tyrone was particularly bitter 
and is a prime example of how inter-Nationalist rivalry plays into the 
hands of the Unionists and is detrimental to the Nationalist cause. 
This bickering combined with the fact of a Unionist electoral pact to 
throw the election to the OUP candidate. The seat was previously 
held by Owen Carron (SF) who won it in a 1981 by-election after his 
predecessor Bobby Sands died in a hunger strike at Maze Prison. 
Because the SDLP did not run a candidate against Carron in the 1981 
by-election, they were chastised by the Unionists for aiding the ter-
rorist cause and taunted by IRA and Sinn Fein supporters for running 
away from a fight. For this reason, although the polls showed that 
the SDLP would probably lose the 1983 election, and possibly throw 
it to a Unionist candidate, they felt that failure to run would deal a 
heavy blow to their credibility. Maginnes (OUP) won the seat with a 
total of nearly 3,000 votes less than the combined Nationalist vote. 
According to Owen Carron, Maginnes won by default and "accused 
the SDLP candidate, Mrs. Rosemary Flanagan, of working in collab-
oration with the Official Unionists to deprive him of his seat."13 Sinn 
Fein considers the SDLP more of a threat than the Unionist parties; 
therefore, the SDLP is usually the object of their strongest polemics, 
for example, "the SDLP was guilty of joint intimidation with the RUC 
against Sinn Fein voters."24 
TABLE 3 
PARTY 
OUP 
DUP 
Alliance 
SDLP 
Sinn Fein 
PUP 
Other 
JUNE 1983 
TOTAL VOTES 
259,952 
152,749 
61,275 
137,012 
102,701 
36,568 
14,650 
PERCENT 
SHARE 
34 
20 
8 
17.9 
13.4 
4.8 
1.9 
NO. OF SEATS 
11 
3 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
TOTAL 764,925 100.00 17 
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TABLE 4 
RESULTS OF THE 9 JUNE 1983 GENER 
OUP' DUP2 
POLITICAL PARTY AND CANDIDAT 
ALLIANCE SDLP» SINN FEIN P 
CONSTITUENCIES 
ANTRIM EAST 
ANTRIM SOUTH 
BELFAST EAST 
BELFAST NORTH 
© BELFAST SOUTH 
BELFAST WEST 
FERMANAGH-
SOUTH TYRONE 
FOYLE 
LAGAN VALLEY 
LONDONDERRY-
EAST 
MID-ULSTER 
ARMAGH-NEWRY 
•14,293 
Beggs 
•17,727 
Forsythe 
9,642 
Burchill 
•15,339 
Walker 
•18,669 
Smyth 
2,435 
Passmore 
•28,630 
Maginnis 
— 
•24,017 
Molyneaux 
•19,469 
Ross 
7,066 
Thompson 
•18,988 
Nicholson 
13,926 
Allister 
10,935 
Thompson 
•17,631 
Robinson 
8,260 
Seawright 
4,565 
McCrea 
2,399 
Haffey 
— 
15,923 
Campbell 
6,801 
Beattie 
12,207 
McClure 
•16,174 
McCrea 
— 
7,620 
Neeson 
4,612 
Mawhinney 
9,373 
Napier 
3,879 
Maguire 
8,945 
Cook 
— 
— 
1,108 
O'Grady 
4,593 
Close 
2,401 
McGrath 
1,735 
Lagan 
— 
1,047 
O'Cleary 
3,377 
Maginness 
519 
Prendiville 
5,944 
Feeney 
3,216 
McDonnell 
10,934 
Hendron 
9,923 
Flanagan 
•24,071 
... 
1,629 
Laverty 
682 
Donaldson 
5,451 
Austin 
1,107 
McKnight 
•16,379 
Adams 
20,954 
Carron 
10,607 
Hume McGuinness 
2,603 
Boomer 
9,397 
Doherty 
12,044 
Haughey 
17,434 
Mallon 
1,751 
McAuley 
7,073 
Davey 
16,096 
Morrison 
9,928 
McAllister 
NORTH ANTRIM 
NORTH DOWN 
SOUTH DOWN 
STRANGFORD 
UPPER BANN 
10,749 
Coulter 
8,261 
McCartney 
*20,693 
Powell 
»19,086 
Taylor 
*24,888 
McCusker 
»23,922 
Paisley 
3,743 
Harvey 
11,716 
Gibson 
4,547 
Wells 
— 
9,015 
Cushnahan 
1,823 
Forde 
6,171 
Morrow 
— 
6,193 
Farren 
645 
O'Baoill 
20,145 
McGrady 1 
1,713 
Curry 
7,807 
McDonnald 
2,860 
McMahon 
4,074 
Fitzsimmons 
— 
4,110 
Curran 
2 
Kilf 
Notes: 1- OUP (Official Unionist Party); 2- DUP (Democratic Unionist Party); 3- SDLP (Social D 
Party). This party only ran one candidate; 5- Electorate (Total number of registered voters in each 
7- Majority (Number of votes separating the winner from the second place candidate); 8- This tota 
* (Winner) 
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In Armagh-Newry as in Fermanagh-South Tyrone, Nationalist 
bickering added to a Unionist electoral pact to throw the election to 
die OUP candidate. Although the combined Nationalist total was 7,000 
more than the poll for the Unionist candidate J. Nicholson, he won 
with a majority of 1,554. 
The election in Mid-Ulster was a free-for-all with intense battles 
within the Unionist and Nationalist camps as well as between Nation-
alists and Unionists. The Unionists were unable to shelve their dif-
ferences and negotiate an electoral pact in spite of the large Nationalist 
majority in this district and the very real possibility that they might 
lose. The combined Nationalist total was over 3,000 more than the 
Unionist total, however the DUP candidate was able to win by 78 votes 
(see Table 4). This election was the closest contest in Ulster. 
Much attention was focussed on two races, Belfast West and South 
Down. There was never any doubt that Belfast West would be won 
by a Nationalist candidate. The main question was, which one? Gerald 
Fitt, Independent Socialist, had held this seat since 1966, and was a 
co-founder of the SDLP, with John Hume, in 1970. The combined 
total of the SDLP and Independent Socialist vote exceeded the vote 
of Gerry Adams (SF) by almost 5,000. Had Fitt and the SDLP been 
able to put aside personal animosities, they might have been able to 
negotiate an electoral pact. This should not have been difficult to do 
as there is so little philosophical difference between them. The main 
stumbling block would have been tactical. While Fitt is a Socialist with 
all the usual accompanying rhetoric, and decidedly to the left of the 
SDLP, Fitt and the SDLP have much more in common than either 
has with Sinn Fein. 
Gerald Fitt had been denounced many times by Unionist politi-
cians. Nevertheless, as the election approached, and it became more 
and more apparent that Sinn Fein might win, the Unionists woke up 
to the fact that they would be better off dealing with a constitutional 
Nationalist than one who relied on violence. "His defeat was described 
as a tragedy by politicians as disparate as Michael Foot (British Labour 
Party leader) and Dr. Ian Paisley (DUP leader)."'5 It is ironic that Dr. 
Paisley and other Unionist politicians waited until Mr. Fitt was de-
feated before speaking well of him, taking so long to recognize, as 
the editor of the Irish Press did, that "If the British Government and 
Northern Unionists refuse to deal with reasonable people, then they 
will end up having to deal with unreasonable ones."16 This is typical 
of Ulster politics and is one of its tragedies. 
There was one hopeful outcome of the Belfast West election. 
According to pollsters, Gerald Fitt's support came in almost equal 
proportion from Catholic and Protestant areas. According to Fitt, he 
had achieved one of the main aims of his political career, "the united 
support of both Protestant and Catholic working classes."17 In truth, 
it is difficult to determine if this vote was more a result of Mr. Fitt's 
personal charisma than it was of any meeting of the minds between 
Catholics and Protestants. Given the general trends of Ulster politics 
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this lack of religious divisiveness probably was a freak occurrence. 
The race in South Down pitted Enoch Powell (OUP) against both 
a divided Nationalist opposition and other Unionist parties. There is 
a deep rift between the DUP and OUP constituency organizations in 
South Down. Mr. Powell had represented South Down since 1974. 
Before then he was a Conservative MP from Wolverhampton W.W. 
(England) 1950-1974, and Minister of Health 1960-1963. He had 
always been a controversial political personality and one of the most 
well-known Unionist politicians. His many years experience in the 
House of Commons give him an understanding of the British political 
system not possessed by any other Ulster politician. He is strongly 
disliked by DUP leader Dr. Ian Paisley and they regularly engage in 
bouts of public name-calling where the language exceeds in vehem-
ence the language they use to describe their feelings toward the SDLP 
and Sinn Fein. 
Most readings of the polls gave the DUP almost no chance of 
winning or even making a respectable showing against Powell. Cecil 
Harvey, the DUP candidate, even lost his deposit because his vote 
total was so low. South Down was "a marginal seat with the vote divided 
almost equally between Nationalists and Unionists . . .."I8 On the Na-
tionalist side the SDLP was the main contender with Sinn Fein given 
almost no chance. Therefore, on the face of it, all non-OUP Unionists 
should have stood down to allow Powell a clear field while the non-
SDLP Nationalists should have stood down to allow the SDLP can-
didate a clear field. Exactly the opposite happened. The recurring 
pattern of self-destructive behavior took place and Powell won by 548 
votes (see Table 4). 
CONCLUSION 
Although Unionists captured fifteen of seventeen seats in the 
Parliamentary election, they have no cause for celebration. The SDLP 
remains the largest Nationalist party but its voter support is slipping. 
It received 65% of the Nationalist vote in the October 1982 Assembly 
elections and 57.4% in the 1983 Parliamentary elections. On the other 
hand Sinn Fein's vote increased from 35% to 42.6%. If this trend 
continues Sinn Fein will soon surpass the SDLP as the major Nation-
alist party. The significant growth in support for Sinn Fein and the 
decline in support for the SDLP, the party of constitutional Nation-
alism, indicates a strong disenchantment with moderate politics by a 
large segment of the Ulster electorate. 
Another important indicator of a decline in support for consensus 
politics was the poor showing of the Alliance Party, the party of mod-
erate Unionism. They advocate continued ties with Great Britain but 
realize that the Nationalist community must also favor this political 
arrangement if the "troubles" are ever to cease. They endorse power-
sharing with the Nationalists and prefer to normalize relations with 
Eire. Their voter popularity has declined steadily since the 1977 local 
elections, when they won 14.4% of the vote. They won 11.9% of the 
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vote in 1979, 9.3% in the 1982 Assembly elections, and only 8% in 
the 1983 Parliamentary elections. Their percentage in the 1982 As-
sembly election (9.3%) was a slight improvement over the 1981 totals 
(8.9%) but does not appear to have represented a permanent move-
ment in their favour. 
A key question is "who speaks for the Catholic minority?" Before 
the Parliamentary elections Sinn Fein was condemned by most British 
officials, Unionist leaders, and church leaders both Catholic and Prot-
estant. Sinn Fein has made their position very clear. In the words of 
Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein candidate for Foyle, "The war for 
national liberation is a legitimate war . . . Britain heeds only one thing 
and that is an Irishman or woman pointing a weapon to its head."19 
Fruitful negotiations with such an organization are, for all practical 
purposes, impossible, and increasing Sinn Fein support will probably 
mean an escalation of the troubles. Should Sinn Fein become the 
major Catholic (Nationalist) party, most Unionist, British and church 
leaders will see this as an endorsement of violence by the Catholic 
community. 
A solution does not appear to be in sight. Solutions such as dual 
nationality have been proposed, that is, Unionists would have the 
option of retaining British citizenship along with their citizenship in 
a united Eire. Another suggested solution is a loose confederation of 
the British Isles which would include Scotland, Wales, England, Ulster 
and Eire. It is hard to envision any Irish politician supporting this 
arrangement and still winning another election. Repartition has been 
proposed by Conor Cruise O'Brien,20 among others. This would entail 
large population transfers, especially in Belfast. Without a total pop-
ulation transfer the same Nationalist-Unionist dilemma would persist, 
though in a smaller geographic area. Moreover the IRA would in-
terpret any ceding of territory to Eire as a first step toward eventual 
unification and, probably, as an incentive to step up terrorist activities. 
Prerequisites for a reduction of tensions are control of the back-
biting between the Unionist parties and Unionist recognition that 
Nationalists belong in the mainstream of Ulster politics. Perhaps a bit 
more Unionist flexibility in acknowledging that moderate Nationalists 
view meaningful power-sharing at the local level as a prerequisite for 
a setdement would be a start. Some form of Unionist acknowledge-
ment that the New Ireland Forum might produce results beneficial 
to all inhabitants of the island would go a long way toward halting 
the slide into extremism. Nationalist politicians, for their part, should 
be aware of the importance of the Protestant dimension of "Irishness." 
There will only be hope if both sides avoid maximalist positions. As 
things now stand Nationalists and Unionists hold radically divergent 
views on the proper shape of the state. Much needs to be done to 
heal the fissures in Ulster society. The politicians have their work cut 
out for them. 
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Footnotes 
* A short note on mechanics. The single transferable vote method of proportional 
representation is used for local elections. There are twelve multiple member con-
stituencies to match the twelve Parliamentary electoral districts. The House of 
Commons, 'Redistribution of Seats' Act, 1979, which took effect with the 1983 
elections, increased the number of Northern Ireland constituencies to seventeen. 
The next Assembly elections, if they occur, will be based on these seventeen 
constituencies. 
** In the Assembly election, the Official Unionist Party took 26 seats and the Dem-
ocratic Unionist Party 21 out of a total of 78. 
*** For the purposes of this article we are interested primarily in the seventeen seats 
held by the Ulster parties. As British Parliamentary elections are run on the first-
past-the-post system, the number of seats that each party wins does not necessarily 
reflect their overall share of the popular vote (see Table 4). 
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